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Abstract
We provide a time-consistent model that addresses the preference reversals that motivate the
time-inconsistency literature. The model subsumes the behavior generated by the time-inconsistency
approach inﬁnitesettingsbut, unlike thetime-inconsistent models, allowsforself-control. Thispaper
provides a brief summary of theoretical results shown elsewhere [Gul and Pesendorfer, Econometrica
69 (2001) 1403; Econometrica, (2002), in press; Rev. Econ. Stud. (2002), in press] and contrasts the
predictions and welfare implications of our model and the time-inconsistent β−δ model.
 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Experiments ﬁnd evidence that individuals resolve the same intertemporal trade-off
differently depending on when the decision is made. (See Loewenstein, 1996 for a recent
survey.) In the typical experiment, subjects choose between a smaller, date 1 reward and
a larger, date 2 reward. If the choice is made at date 1 then the smaller–earlier reward is
chosen. If the choice is made earlier (at date 0) then the larger–later reward is chosen.
We interpret the behavior documented in experiments on time preference as part of
a broader phenomenon of struggling with temptations. In the decision problem above,
subjects ﬁnd immediate rewards tempting. When the decision is made in period 1, the
smaller–earlier reward can be consumed immediately and hence constitutes a temptation.
As a result, the agent is more inclined to choose the smaller–earlier reward. When the
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decision is made in period 0, neither of the two rewards can be consumed immediately and
hence the decision is unaffected by temptations.
How can we decide which alternatives are temptations? Consider again the above
decision problem and suppose that the agent must choose between the following two
alternatives in period 0. The ﬁrst alternative offers commitment to the larger–later reward.
The second alternative offers the option of choosing either reward in period 1. If the
agent expresses a strict preference for the ﬁrst alternative over the second, we say that the
smaller–earlier reward is a temptation. In that case, the agent strictly prefers to eliminate
the smaller–earlier reward from his period-1 options. Hence, an alternative is identiﬁed as
a temptation if its availability makes the agent worse-off.
When the agent cannot exclude a temptation from the period-1 choice set he will either
succumb or exercise costly self-control. Self-control describes a situation where the agent
does not choose the most tempting alternative. In the example above, the agent would
exercise self-control if he strictly prefers a situation where the smaller–earlier reward is
not available but still chooses the larger–later reward when the smaller–earlier reward
is available. We interpret this combination of period-0 and period-1 choices as situation
where the individual exercises costly self-control in period 1. If the smaller–earlier reward
were not available the individual would be better off because he would not incur the cost
of self-control.
We discuss the conceptual ideas in more detail in Section 2. There we also provide
a representation of preferences for a two-period decision problem. Section 3 extends the
model to ﬁnite horizon decision problems.
Our work is related to the time-inconsistency literature. Starting with Strotz (1956),
authors have analyzed models of changing (time-)preference. That approach assumes that
the agent is an independent decision-maker in every period and resolves conﬂicts between
the various “selves” in a game theoretic manner.1 In Section 4, we show that for ﬁnite
decisionproblemswe can re-interpretthe time-inconsistencymodelasa temptationmodel.
Hence, for ﬁnite decision problems our model subsumes the behavior of time-inconsistent
agents. The converse is not true because time-inconsistent models do not allow for self-
control. In Section 5, we discuss applications and illustrate how predictions differ for the
time-inconsistent model and the model with self-control.
Section 5.2 considers a competitive economy with liquid and illiquid assets. As
Kocherlakota (1996) points out, the time-inconsistency approach predicts that agents will
specialize in their asset holdings and either hold only liquid or only illiquid assets. In
contrast, our model allows for mixed asset holding and hence comes closer to matching
observed behavior. Section 5.3 discusses the conditions under which agents beneﬁt from
theintroductionofanintergenerationaltransfer.Inarecentpaper,Imrohorogluetal.(2002)
point out that time-inconsistent agents will typically not beneﬁt from such a system. We
illustrate how a different conclusion may emerge in a model with self-control.
1 Strotz (1956) assumes that every period the decision maker maximizes utility among all plans that
are consistent with incentives of future selves. He refers to this behavior as consistent planning. Peleg and
Yaari (1973) note that consistent plans are not well deﬁned unless the decision problem is ﬁnite and use Nash
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Section 5.4 considers a model in which gambles that offer immediate returns constitute
temptations. Such preferencesmay help explain why some types of gamblesare prohibited
or regulated while other risky investments such as stocks are not. The difference between
gambling and stock investing lies in the timing of returns. Stock investing offers risky
returns with a delay whereas casino gambling offers risky returnswith immediate rewards.
For agents described in Section 5.4 only the latter is a temptation and hence only the latter
offers room for welfare improving regulation.
Section 6 analyzes inﬁnite horizon choice problems. In particular, we focus on
a standard consumption–savings model. As is the case for standard time-separable
preferences, optimal behavior in our model is described as the solution of a standard
dynamic programming problem. This is in contrast to the time-inconsistency approach
which must confront a folk-theoremlike multiplicity of outcomes in this case.2 Our model
doesnotexhibitthiskindofmultiplicityand,inparticular,assignstoeachdecisionproblem
a unique value.
Section 7 contrasts welfare analysis in our model and the time-inconsistent model. In
standard economic models the welfare of an agent is synonymous with his choices. That
is, if the agent chooses alternative a over alternative b then this means that a leads to
higher welfare than b. Our model retains this feature of standard theory. In particular, if
our model predicts that agents “should” prefer a particular policy (for example, smokers
should prefer an increase in cigarette taxes) then behavior contradicting that prediction
(for example, smokers voting against an increase in cigarette taxes) is evidence that the
model is incorrect. However, our model differs from standard economic models in that the
agent values commitment. Hence, to evaluate welfare, we have to keep track of both the
individuals consumption choices and his commitment choices.
In contrast, the time-inconsistency literature assumes that each decision-maker consists
of a sequence of distinct agents—called the (multi)selves. Each self has a different
preference over consumption streams. Hence the period-t self’s choice of alternative a
over b reﬂects only the fact that given the predicted behavior of the subsequent selves,
a leads to a consumption stream that is better for the period-t self than the one induced
by b. Other selves may be and often are made worse-off by this choice. In the time-
inconsistency literature the selves do not value commitment per se; commitment has value
only as a vehicle for one of the selves to impose his preferences on subsequent selves.
With multiple selves, ﬁnding an adequate welfare criterion is difﬁcult. This is why
researchers have used a variety of alternative criteria. For example, O’Donoghue and
Rabin (1999) maximize the utility of the period-0 self. There are at least two problems
with this welfare criterion. First, since the preferencesof the period-0 self can no longer be
observed,welfare trade-offsare made based not on observablechoice but on the modeler’s
conjectures regarding what these choices would have been if they could been put to the
period-0 self. Hence, an assertion of the form “policy a is better than policy b” can
never be refuted. Second, even if the preferences of the period-0 self could be veriﬁed,
it does not seem reasonable for a social planner to align himself with an agent who is no
longerpresent.Appliedto aneconomywith multipleagents(asopposedto multipleselves)
2 As Krusell and Smith (2003) show, reﬁnements such as Markov perfection do not alleviate this multiplicity.246 F. Gul, W. Pesendorfer / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 243–264
such as an overlapping generations model or a dynastic model, this criterion would yield
absurd policy recommendations. In the concluding section of our paper, we point out the
shortcomings of the other welfare criterion for the multiselves approach.
2. A model of self-control
We begin with a simple two-period model. Consumption takes place in period 1.
In period 0, the agent takes an action that affects the set of alternatives available in
period 1. We can think of the period-0 problem as a choice among sets of alternatives.
The interpretation is that in period 1 the agent must pick an alternative from the set chosen
in period 0.
The model takes as given a preference relation (denoted ) over sets of consumption
lotteries.Thispreferencecapturestheagent’speriod-0behavior.Ourobjectiveistoidentify
assumptionson period-0 behaviorthat can be interpretedas comingfroman individualthat
expectsto strugglewith temptationin the period1 andmayhavetheability to exerciseself-
control. A complete analysis of this model can be found in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001).
Here we illustrate the main ideas.
Let c ∈ C denote consumption in period 1 and let p denote a consumption lottery. We
use c to denote also the degenerate lottery that yields c with probability 1. Let B denote a
set of consumption lotteries.
Suppose the agent is a standard expected utility maximizer. Then, he has a utility













This standard agent satisﬁes the following key property (Kreps, 1979):
B  B  ⇒ B ∼ B ∪B . (S)
That is, if the set B is weakly preferred to the set B  then adding the alternatives in B  to
B has no effect on the agent’s welfare. Kreps shows that this property characterizes the
standard agent. That is, if the preference over sets satisﬁes (S) then we can ﬁnd a utility
function u such that B  B  if and only if inequality (1) holds for that u. Assumption
(S) rules out the possibility that the agent may beneﬁt from the alternatives in the inferior
set B . 3 Moreover, (S) rules out the possibility that the agent is harmed by the addition of
the alternatives in B . Our model of temptation and self-control relaxes the latter aspect of
(S).
The preference {c} {c,c } expresses a desire to commit. In our model, the availability
of c  is undesirable because it represents a temptation in period 1. For example, c  may
3 Kreps (1979), Dekel et al. (2001) explore preferences where this aspect of (S) may be violated.F. Gul, W. Pesendorfer / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 243–264 247
be some unhealthy food or cigarettes or some other consumption good that is commonly
associated with a preference for commitment. When the availability of c  makes the agent
worse-off, we require that {c,c }  {c }. We interpret {c,c }∼{ c } as a situation where
the agent succumbs to the temptation presented by c . In contrast, {c,c } { c } is situation
where temptation lowers the agent’s welfare but the availability of c remains beneﬁcial.
We interpret this as an instance of self-control. The agent chooses c in period 1 but must
bear a disutility of self-control triggered by the presence of c .
More generally, the key assumption of our model is set betweenness:
B  B  ⇒ B  B ∪B   B . (SB)
Set betweenness captures the idea that the source of the preference for commitment are
temptations. Moreover, there is a ranking of alternatives according to how tempting they
are. The agent’s well-being is affected only by the most tempting alternative. To see the
connection between SB and our temptation interpretation consider the choice problems
B,B  with B  B . Temptations can only lower the agent’s utility. Hence, B  B ∪ B .
If the most tempting alternative from B ∪ B  is in B then the addition of B  to B does
not affect the agent’s welfare and we have B ∪ B   B (which implies B ∪ B  ∼ B since
B  B ∪B ). If the mosttempting alternativefrom B∪B  is in B  then the additionof B to
B  cannot lower the agent’s utility and we have B ∪B  B . In either case, SB is satisﬁed.
In Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) we show that SB together with the standard axioms
that yield expected utility imply (and are implied by) the following representation of the
preference : there are two von Neumann–Morgensternutility functions u and v such that



















The function u represents the agent’s ranking over alternatives when he is committed to
a single choice. To see this, note that when B consists of only one element the v-terms in
the above formula drop out.
When the agent is not committed to a single choice then his welfare is affected by the
temptation utility represented by v. Consider the two element choice set B ={ c,c } and
assume that u(c) > u(c ). We can distinguish three cases.
(1) When v(c)  v(c ) then the commitment and temptation utilities agree. In this case
there is no preference for commitment since {c,c }∼{ c}. The agent chooses c in
period 1.
(2) When v(c )>v ( c )and u(c ) + v(c )>u ( c )+ v(c),t h e nc  is a temptation, that is,








v(˜ c)= u(c ).
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(3) When v(c )>v( c)and u(c)+v(c)>u(c )+v(c ), then as in case (2) the alternative
c  is a temptation. However, in this case {c} { c,c } { c }. This is a case where the
agent exercises self-control: he chooses c in period 1 but incurs a utility penalty of
v(c ) −v(c)>0 which we interpret as the cost of self-control.
Period1 choicesmaximizeu+v. Hence,period-1 behaviormaximizesa utilityfunction
that is a “compromise” between the temptation and the commitment utilities. Recall that
our model makes assumptions only on period-0 behavior. In Gul and Pesendorfer (2001)
we also provide an extended model that assumes we observe the agent’s behavior in
period 0 (the preference ) and his behavior in period 1 (the choice from B). In that
model, we give conditions on behavior in both periods such that period-0 preferences are
represented by a formula given in (1) and period-1 choices maximize u+v.
3. Dynamic models of self-control
Applications of self-control often require a more elaborate dynamic setting. For
example, we may want to consider the behavior of a household who faces a consumption–
savings problem. Each period, this individual makes a decision that yields a consumption
for that period and wealth for the next period.
More generally, a ﬁnite horizon decision problem should be thought of as a decision
tree. Every period t = 1,...,T, the agent chooses from a set of alternatives. In the ﬁnal
period (period T), the decision problem speciﬁes a (compact) set of consumption choices.
We allow consumption to be stochastic hence period-T choices yield a consumption
lottery. In period T −1, a decision problem is a set of alternatives, each yielding a lottery
over consumption for period T − 1 and decision problems for period T . We continue in
this fashion to deﬁne decision problems for periods T − 2,T − 3,..., etc. The notation
Bt is used to denote a period-t decision problem and Bt denotes the (collection of)
period-t decision problems. Hence, Bt is a (compact)set of lotteries which yield a period-t
consumption ct ∈ C and a decision problem for period t +1, Bt+1.W eu s ept to denote an
element of Bt. Note that pt is a probability measure deﬁned on C ×Bt+1.
To describethe behaviorof the agent in this multi-periodsetting we analyzepreferences
over decision problems starting in period 1, B1. These preferences capture the period-0
behavior of this agent. Note that we assume that in period 0 there is no consumption.
Standard assumptions needed for a separable expected utility representation together












The function Wt−1 represents the agent’s preference over choice problems that “start” in
period t, that is, choice problems where prior to period t the agent is committed to some
consumption path. The continuous function u + Wt is the commitment utility in period tF. Gul, W. Pesendorfer / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 243–264 249
(analogous to u in the 2-period problem). The continuous function Vt is the temptation
utilityin periodt (analogousto v inthe two-periodproblem).Intheterminalperiod(period
T), there is no continuation problem and hence









Note that once v is substituted for VT and u is substituted for uT the formula for terminal
date choice problems is the same as the formula in the previous section.







in subsequentperiods. This behavior represents the optimal compromisebetween commit-
ment and temptation utilities.
To illustrate dynamic self-control preferences consider the following three-period
example. There are two consumption periods, 1 and 2, and one consumption good
c ∈[0, ¯ c]. The temptation utility depends only on current consumption. In particular,
assume that
V1(c,Bt+1) = V2(c) = v(c), ut(c) = u(c)

























since both sides are simply the maximal consumption in B2. In that case, temptation plays




In period 1, the agent is tempted to choose the maximally feasible consumption for that
period whereas the commitment utility wishes to maximize u(c1) + u(c2). We will use
this setting in the following sections to provide simple examples of economies with self-
control preferences and to contrast our model with the dynamically inconsistent models of
hyperbolic discounting.
4. Self-control and time-inconsistency
Strotz (1956) proposes a model of changing preferences. Each period, the decision-
maker is thought to have a distinct utility function. Consistent planning requires that the250 F. Gul, W. Pesendorfer / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 243–264
decision-makertake into accountfuture changesin the utility functionand “reject any plan
that he will not follow through. His problem is then to ﬁnd the best plan among those he
will actually follow” (Strotz, 1956).
Our approach does not postulate a change in preference. Nevertheless, the behavior
of consistent planners as deﬁned by Strotz emerges as a special case of temptation
preferences if we restrict to ﬁnite deterministic choice problems. Consider a ﬁnite subset
of consumption choices  C ⊂ C.L e t Bt be the collection of deterministic t-period choice
problems corresponding to  C. That means that if Bt ∈ Bt then all elements of Bt yield a
particularconsumptionc ∈  C andachoiceproblemBt+1 ∈  Bt+1.We denotewith (c,Bt+1)
the degenerate lottery that yields c and Bt+1 with probability 1.
Note that every Bt ∈  Bt is a ﬁnite set and, in addition, there are ﬁnitely many decision
problems in  Bt. Therefore, we can choose λ>0 large enough so that
argmax
Bt
(ut +Wt +λVt) ⊂ argmax
Bt
Vt (5)
for all Bt ∈  Bt. But this means that the agent maximizes Vt in every choice problem
Bt ∈  Bt. Plugging Eq. (5) into the representation yields
Wt−1(Bt) = ut(c)+Wt(Bt+1)
subject to (c,Bt+1) ∈ argmax
Bt
Vt(c,Bt+1). (6)
Equation (6) can be interpreted as the Strotz model of consistent planning: In period t,t h e
agentmaximizesVt. Inperiod0,theagentevaluatesperiod-t choiceswith adifferentutility
function u+Wt. Consistent planning means that the individualtreats period-t choices as a
constraintwhenevaluatingBt.Tofurtherillustratetheconnectiontothetime-inconsistency
literature we draw on the Krusell et al.’s (2002, 2003) work:
ut(c) = δt−1u(c), Vt(c,Bt+1) = u(c)+βWt(Bt+1), VT(c) = δT−1u(c).
Then, setting  Wt = δt−1Wt we can rewrite (6) as
 Wt−1(Bt) = u(c)+δ  Wt(Bt+1)
subject to (c,Bt+1) ∈ argmax
Bt
u(c)+βδ Wt(Bt+1) (7)
with  WT−1(BT ) = maxc∈BT u(c). The behavior of this agent corresponds to the β−δ
model ﬁrst introduced by Phelps and Pollak (1968) and later used by Laibson (1997). The
commitment utility u+Wt and the temptation utility u+βWt differ in how they discount
the immediate future. Behavior maximizes u + βWt in every period but in period 0 this
behavior is evaluated with the more patient utility function u+Wt.
When there are only two decision periods, the restriction to ﬁnite choice problems is
not necessary. As we show in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), the Strotz model is a special
case of the self-control model if we do not require preferences to be continuous. When
the model has more than 2 periods and choice problems are not ﬁnite, it is no longer
possible to describe the Strotz model as the solution to a maximization problem (see Peleg
and Yaari, 1973; Gul and Pesendorfer, 2002b). Instead, starting with Peleg and Yaari,
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implication of the game theoretic approach is that period-0 behavior cannot be described
by a preference relation. Hence, the revealed preference approach runs into difﬁculty at a
very basic level. In contrast, the self-control preferences described above are well-deﬁned
for general compact choice problems.
5. Predictions and evidence
Among psychologists and medical professionals it is held as self evident that “people
oftenact againsttheir self-interestin fullknowledgethatthey are doingso;theyexperience
a feeling of being ‘out of control’” (Loewenstein, 1996). Evidence of out-of-control
behavior is sought in the actions of drug addicts, or people who are subject to extreme
emotional or physical stress.
Revealed preference theory deﬁnes the interest of people to be what they do. Since
there is no objective standard of behavior it is unclear what it would mean for an agent to
act against his self-interest. To incorporate visceral inﬂuences into a revealed preference
theory,we must identifythe presenceof visceralinﬂuencesfromthe agent’sbehavioralone
without reference to an external standard. In other words, we must ﬁnd a subjective notion
of ‘acting against one’s self-interest.’
Our model does this by analyzing behavior at a stage where the agent is not (yet)
subject to temptation (or other visceral inﬂuences) but rather chooses among situations
with differing temptations. These choices reveal how the agent evaluates the impact
of those temptations and hence establishes a subjective notion of self-interest free of
visceral inﬂuences. Hence, to distinguish between standard utility maximizing behavior
andbehaviorthatissubjecttovisceralinﬂuenceswemustconsiderbehaviorwheresubjects
choose between “choice situations,” that is, decision problems.
Standard behavior is identiﬁed by Axiom (S). In particular, Axiom (S) rules out any
preference for commitment, that is, a strict preference for fewer options. In contrast,
temptation preferences but also models of dynamically inconsistent behavior allow for
a preference for commitment. Hence, violations of (S) that exhibit a preference for
commitment would be a natural starting point to look for evidence.
There are few studies that examine whether subjects have a preferencefor commitment.
Wertenbroch (1998) ﬁnds evidence that people buy smaller quantities of tempting goods
even when those goods are sold with quantity discounts. Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002)
let students choose whether to impose deadlines for class assignments and ﬁnd that
many students choose to impose deadlines that constrain their future choices. Green
and Rachlin (1996) conduct experiments with pigeons that ﬁnds evidence in favor of a
preference for commitment.
A much larger body of evidence deals with a related phenomenon, preference
reversals. Subjects are asked to choose between smaller–earlier and larger–later rewards.
Experiments document the following preference reversal. When the delay to both rewards
is increased, subjects tend to switch their preference from the earlier to the later reward
(see Frederick et al., 2002 for a survey of this and related experimental literature).
To see how the temptation model can account for preference reversals, we consider
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deterministic, there is one consumptiongood and ct ∈[ 0, ¯ c]. The period-0 preference over





−maxv(c1), W1(B1) = maxu(c2).
The above utility function represents an individual who is tempted by immediate
consumption. In the terminal period (period 2), he consumes all the remaining endowment
and hence temptation plays no role (W1 = maxu(c2)). In period 1, the agent is tempted by
current consumption since the temptation utility v depends on c1 only.
In period 1, the agent maximizes u+v +δW1. Plugging in for W1 we can simplify the






Suppose the agent (at date 1) can choose to transfer resources to date 2 (or vice versa) at






Now suppose that the agentis asked to choose consumptionin periods1 and 2 at date 0.
By making the choice in date 0 we “increase the delay to both rewards.” To be consistent
with the experimental ﬁndings the agent should now make more patient choices.
Note that if the agent commits in period 0 to a consumptionchoice (c1,c2) then there is
no temptation in period 1. That is, the maximal period-1 consumption in c1 and hence the
v-terms drop out. Therefore commitment to (c1,c2) in period 0 yields the utility
u(c1)+δu(c2).





Hence, period-0 commitment choices imply a lower rate of time preference. The reason is
thatcommitmentavoidstheutilitycostoftemptationassociatedwithtransferringresources
from period 1 to 2.
Note that our interpretation of the experimental evidence assumes that the agent is
committed to his period-0 consumption choices. In particular, this means that at date 1
he cannot “undo” his choices by borrowing or simply consuming a greater share of
his period-1 income. If the agent is not committed to a consumption path but rather
faces a lifetime budget constraint then neither self-control preferences nor dynamically
inconsistent models would predict a preference reversal. By a simple arbitrage argument
the agent would pick the alternative with the higher net present value at the market interest
rate independentof the timing of the choice. Therefore, the discounting evidence is at best
indirect evidence for the temptation or the dynamic inconsistency model. Unlike a direct
test based on choice problems, the discounting evidence relies on the assumption that the
delayed rewards offer commitment.
As we argued above, our model includes the behavior of agents with β−δ preferences
as a special case. However, unlike the latter model, we allow for self-control. As withF. Gul, W. Pesendorfer / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 243–264 253
visceral inﬂuences, it is not clear how we could determine whether an agent exercises
self-control when he makes a particular choice. Our method of identifying self-control
is to study behavior prior to moment when the need for self-control may arise. When
the agent chooses among decision problems he may reveal whether or not he expects to
exercise self-control. Consider a situation where the agent prefers commitment to c over
the choice between the lotteries c and c . As we argued in Section 2, the agent expects to
use self-control when facing B ={ c,c } if
{c} {c,c } { c }.
We interpret the above preference to represent a situation where the agent chooses c
but is tempted by c  and therefore incurs a positive cost of self-control. The dynamic
inconsistency literature assumes that self-control does not occur. That is,
{c,c }∼{ c }.
In other words, the agent does not beneﬁt when c is added to a choice problem that
contains c . We are not aware of any experimental evidence about self-control.
In the following two subsections we contrast the behavior of agents with and
without self-control when they have commitment opportunities such as illiquid assets.
In these settings clear differences emerge between agents who exercise self-control and
dynamically inconsistent agents who do not exercise self-control.
5.1. Illiquid assets
A preference for commitment suggests that agents have a demand for commitment
devices. One example of an institution that may provide some commitment are illiquid
assets, such as housing. In this section, we provide a simple example of a two-period
representative household economy with liquid and illiquid assets.
We ﬁrst analyze a model with self-control preferences. In the competitive equilibrium
the representative household holds both liquid and illiquid assets. The illiquid asset carries
a commitment premium since it allows the agent to reduce the cost of self-control.
Kocherlakota (2001) analyzes a version of this example for time-inconsistent prefer-
ences. He demonstrates (and we illustrate below) that the model with one household does
not admit a competitive equilibrium in this case. The reason is that the agent can never
simultaneously hold the liquid and the illiquid asset. To ﬁnd a competitive equilibrium we
must assume a continuum of identical households with some fraction of households only
holding the liquid assets and the remainder holding only illiquid assets.
Consider the following three-period economy. There is one consumption good c ∈
[0, ¯ c]. In period 0, there is no consumption but agents trade assets. The period-0
endowment of assets is the only endowment in the economy.
There are three assets, indexed j ∈{ 1,2,3}. Asset 1 is traded in period 0 and returns
two units of consumption in period 1. Assets 2 is traded in periods 0 and 1 and returns
one unit of consumption in period 2. Assets 3 is traded only in period 0 and returns one
unit of consumption in period 2. Hence assets 2 and 3 have the same return but asset 3
is not traded in period 1. Furthermore, short selling of assets is prohibited. Therefore,
asset 3 offers commitment because it cannot be sold (or borrowed against) in period 1. For254 F. Gul, W. Pesendorfer / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 243–264
example, if the agent holds one unit of asset 3 and no other assets, then in period 1 he
is committed to 1 unit of consumption in period 2. Let ztj denote the agent’s holdings of
asset j in period t and let qtj denote the price of asset j in period t.
We assume a representative agent who is endowed with 1 unit of each asset.
5.1.1. Self-control preferences












where u is concave and u(c)−λu(x +c) is concave for all x ∈[ 0, ¯ c].
In this economy, the choice problems B1 and B2 depend on the agent’s asset holdings.
We write B1(z0) to denote the choice problem generated by the asset holding z0 =
(z01,z02,z03). The choice problem B2 is trivial: the agent simply consumes all the














(c1,z12) | c1 +q12z12 = 2z01 +q12z02

.
We normalize q03 = 1. The agent’s budget constraint in period 0 is
b0 :=

(z01,z02,z03) | 1−z03 = q01z01 +q02z02

.








Since thisis a representativeagent economy,in a competitiveequilibriumthe household
must choose z0j = 1a n dz12 = 1. Moreover, consumption must equal 2 in both periods.
A straightforward calculation (using the ﬁrst order condition of the maximization problem
on the right-hand side of (8)) implies that
u (2)(1+λ) = u (2)q12
and hence
q12 = 1/(1+λ).
Plugging q12 into W0(B1(z0)) and substituting for the equilibrium quantities then allows
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For λ = 0, this yields the expected result that q02 = q03.F o rλ>0, asset 3 commands a
commitment premium. The reason is that holding asset 3 reduces the cost of self-control
in period 1.
Notice that the self-control model allows us to infer asset prices just like in a standard
Lucas tree economy.The commitmentpremiumis derivedby assessing the marginaleffect
of asset holdings on the cost of self-control.
5.1.2. Time-inconsistent preferences
Next assume that the agent has β−δ preferences. In particular, assume that the period-0
utility function is
u(c1)+u(c2),
whereas the period-1 utility function is
u(c1)+βu(c2)
with 0 <β<1. In period 2, the agent simply maximizes u(c2).
In this case, there does not exist an equilibrium for strictly concave u. Intuitively, the
failure of existence can be explained as follows: In the dynamically inconsistent model,
illiquid assets can only offer valuable commitment if the agent does not hold any liquid
asset. As long as the agent holds some liquid assets he is not committed at the margin and
therefore is not willing to pay a commitment premium. But if the commitment premium is
zero then there is a corner solution where the agent achieves full commitment.
To verify the nonexistence of equilibrium formally, ﬁrst recall that equilibrium requires
ct = 2,t= 1,2,z 0j = 1,j= 1,2,3a n dz12 = 1. Furthermore, at date 1 the equilibrium
price of asset 1 must satisfy
q12 = β
since in period1 theagentmustbe indifferentbetweentransferringwealthbetweenperiods
2 and 3. Normalize q01 = 2. Suppose the agent increases the holding of asset 3 by  
and ﬁnances this increase by an   reduction in the holding of assets 2. At the allocation
z0j = 1,∀j, this change does not affect the consumption in any period. Since u is strictly
concaveand q12 = β, the agentwill notchangehisasset holdingin period1. Therefore,the
change in the portfolio leaves the agent indifferent. But this implies that at an equilibrium
we must have
q02 = q03,
and since no arbitrage requires,
q02 = q01q12/2,
it follows that
q02 = q03 = β.
However, at these prices the agent is not willing to hold his endowment of assets. Holding
the endowment yields a utility of
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By holding only assets 1 and 3 the agent can achieve the utility
maxu(c1)+u(c2)
subject to c1 +βc2 = 2(1+β)
which is greater than the utility of holding the endowment.
To get an equilibrium for the time-inconsistent model, we must assume that there is
a continuum of identical households. Some fraction α will hold only the illiquid asset
whereas the fraction 1 − α of households holds the liquid asset. As Kocherlakota (2001)
emphasizes, the prediction of exclusive holding is contradicted by the data. People who
hold illiquid assets such as houses or IRAs, also hold liquid assets such as bank accounts.
This suggests that if illiquid assets have a role as commitment devices then the self-control
model is the more appropriate model to incorporate this role.
5.2. Social security
In this section, we illustrate the welfare effects of a simple “inter-generational”transfer.
Consider the following 3-period model. In period 0, the agent must choose a transfer
τ ∈[ 0,1]. In period 1, the agent is endowed with 1 unit of wealth. The government taxes
τ units of the agent’s endowment. The agent must decide how much to consume (c1)a n d
how much to save (1− τ − c1). Saving is constrained to be non-negative. In period 2, the
agent receives a subsidy of τ and hence his period-2 wealth (and period-2 consumption)is
τ +(1+r)(1−τ −c1).
5.2.1. Self-control preferences







λu(c1), W1(B2) = max
B2
u.
The choice problem B1 depends on the transfer τ. We write B1(τ) to denote the choice
problem when the transfer is τ.
Assumethat limc→0u (c) =∞.Thenfor τ sufﬁcientlysmall, optimal behaviorsatisﬁes
c1 < 1 − τ. That is, the agent chooses to save some of his period-1 wealth. Then, we can













An increase in τ has two effects; it reduces the cost of self-control in period 1 (λu(1− τ)
is reduced) and therefore increases welfare. An increase in τ also affects the consumptions
c1,c2.W h e nr>0, a straightforward revealed preference argument establishes that this
effect is negative because an increase in τ reduces the agent’s wealth. For r sufﬁciently
close to zero the overall welfare effect of an increase of τ is positive.
5.2.2. Time-inconsistent agents
Imrohoroglu et al. (2002) analyze equilibria of an overlapping generations model with
agents who are time-inconsistent. Their calibration (Table 7) shows that unfunded socialF. Gul, W. Pesendorfer / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 243–264 257
security is unlikely to ﬁnd support in such an economy. At most 6% of the population
would vote for introduction of social security in their model.
Below,weillustratewhyagentswithtime-inconsistentpreferencesmaynotbeneﬁtfrom
the introduction of a social security transfer. In period 1, the agent has the utility function
u(c1)+βu(c2).
In period 0, the agent evaluates the subsequent choices with the utility function
u(c1)+u(c2).
Note that there is no consumption in period 0 and hence period-0 utility function does not
exhibit a presence bias. If we set β = 1/(1 + λ) then the β−δ model and the self-control
model make the same predictions about behavior in periods 1 and 2. That is, both models
predict the same consumption pattern c1,c2. In addition, both models predict the same
consumption choices if the agent can commit to c1,c2 in period 0.
However,the two models differ in how the agent evaluates the effect of the transfer τ in
period 0. Again, consider the case where τ is sufﬁciently small so that the optimal choice
for c1 is strictly less than 1 − τ. In this case, the optimal consumption choice solves the
following unconstrained maximization problem:
maxu(c1)+βu(c2)
subject to c1 +c2/(1+r) 1−rτ.
An increase in τ therefore amounts to a reduction in overall wealth in this case. Such a
reduction can never increase the agent’s utility in period 0.
While the self-controlmodel predicts that a small intergenerationaltransfer may beneﬁt
the individualsuch a transfer can never beneﬁt the time-inconsistentagent in period 0. The
reason is that even after the transfer is introduced, young agents save (c1 < 1 − τ)a n d
hence are unconstrained in their period-1 consumption. But this implies that there is no
commitment beneﬁt to the transfer. It is this feature of the time-inconsistent model that
leads to the Imrohoroglu et al. (2002) conclusion that at most 6% of the US population is
likely to support social security.
In contrast, self-control preferences allow for the possibility that agents beneﬁt from
non-binding constraints. The intergenerational transfer can be interpreted as such a non-
binding constraint: it reduces wealth available for consumption when the agent is young
but does not constrain the agent because even after its introduction saving is positive. As
our example illustrates, when interest rates are low young agents will beneﬁt from such a
transfer.
A complete analysis of the effects of a transfer must also consider the price effects
of such a policy. Imrohoroglu et al. (2002) do this for the case of time-inconsistent
preferences. A similar analysis for self-control preferences has not been conducted.
5.3. Gambling and risk aversion
This section considers an agent who is tempted to gamble. This can be captured by a
temptationutilitythat is a convexfunctionofcurrentconsumption.Thisformof temptation258 F. Gul, W. Pesendorfer / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 243–264
hastwo effects: agentsaretemptedby riskyinstantaneouslotteriesbutare risk averse when
evaluating risky assets that pay-off in future periods.
As an illustration, we again consider a simple three-period model. A related analysis
for the inﬁnite horizon case can be found in Gul and Pesendorfer (2002a). There are two
consumptionperiods, 1 and 2, and one consumptiongood c ∈[ 0, ¯ c]. The temptationutility
depends only on current consumption. Let u(c) and v(c) be increasing functions with v





















Suppose, the agent has a constant endowment ¯ c and cannot borrow or save. Assume
that a lottery with the (stochastic) period-1 payoff R ∈ (−I,I)is offered to the agent at no
cost. The agent will accept that lottery if
E

u(¯ c +R)+v(¯ c +R)

 u(¯ c)+v(¯ c).
Notethatthecontinuationproblemremainsunaffectedbythedecisionbecauseweassumed
the agent cannot transfer wealth between periods. Next, assume that the same lottery is
offered but now the payment of the return is delayed by one period. That is, the agent
decides in period 1 whether to accept the stochastic reward R for period 2. In this case, the
agent compares two choice problems. If he rejects the lottery the period-2 choice problem
is Br
2 ={¯ c}, i.e., the agent is committed to the consumption ¯ c in period 2. If he accepts the
lottery the choice problem is Ba
2 ={¯ c + R}, i.e., the agent is committed to the stochastic










u(¯ c +R)+v(¯ c +R)−v(¯ c +R)








If v is convex and u is concave then u+v is less risk averse than u and hence the agent is
more willing to take risk with respect to lotteries that pay off immediately.
A risk loving temptation utility may help explain why the purchase of certain lotteries
are prohibited or regulated while other risky investments such as stocks are not. In our
interpretation, the difference between gambling and stock investing lies in the timing of
the return.Stock investingoffersrisky returnswith a delay whereascasino gamblingoffers
risky returns with immediate rewards. The latter is a temptation and agents with a risk
loving temptation utility are better off if such lotteries are not available.
6. Inﬁnite horizon
In this section, we illustrate how self-control preferences can be applied to inﬁnite
horizon decision problems. The contrast between the self-control model and models ofF. Gul, W. Pesendorfer / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 243–264 259
time-inconsistent agents is most apparent in inﬁnite horizon settings. The self-control
modelleads to standard dynamic programmingproblemsthat can be solved using standard
techniques. Models of time-inconsistent decision making must be solved as dynamic
games. With an inﬁnite horizon there is typically a folk-theorem type multiplicity of
equilibria in these games. In contrast, the self-control model implies that each decision
problem can be assigned a unique value.
Inﬁnite horizon decision problems can be described in a simple recursive manner: an
inﬁnite horizon decision problem is a (compact) set of lotteries B such that each lottery
yields a current consumption and an inﬁnite horizon decision problem B .4 As before, the
model speciﬁes a preference over decision problems. We assume throughout that these
preferences can be represented by a utility function. In the inﬁnite horizon case W(B)
denotes the utility of the decision problem B. This utility function is analogous to the
value function in standard decision problems.
Assume that—with the exception of (S)—the preference satisﬁes the standard assump-
tions that yield separable and recursive preferences. We replace (S) with (SB). Then, the










The functions u,V are continuous and δ ∈ (0,1) (for details see Gul and Pesendorfer,
2002a).
The equation above deﬁnes a standard dynamic programming problem. The problem
is recursive and represents a time-consistent preference in the following sense. In every
periodt>0, theagent makeschoicesthatmaximize u+δW+V. These choicesmaximize
the agent’s utility (at any decision date). The preferences are different from standard utility
functions in that the agent’s utility depends directly on the decision problem because the
problem affects his cost of self-control. The cost of self-control when the agent chooses
p is the difference between the maximal temptation utility and the temptation utility of p,
that is, maxp ∈B

V dp  −

V dp.
Next, we specialize to the case where the temptation utility V depends only on current
consumption. Hence, we assume
V(c,B)= v(c).
Consider a standard consumption–savings problem without uncertainty. The agent has










The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for an interior solution are
u (ct) +v (ct) = δ(1+r)

u (ct+1)+v (ct+1)−v (wt+1)

4 For a formal deﬁnition of multi-period decision problems, see Gul and Pesendorfer (2002a).260 F. Gul, W. Pesendorfer / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 243–264
wherewt+1 = (1+r)(wt−ct).Kruselletal.(2003)considerthespecialcasewherev = λu
and u = (1 − σ)−1c1−σ for σ>0. For this isoelastic case, the consumption function is










The fraction of wealth consumed by the individual depends on the interest rate and on the
parameters of the utility function (δ,λ,σ). An increase in λ decreases the weight on the
temptation utility and leads to a decrease in the individual’s (instantaneous) self-control.
As a consequence, the agent acts more impatiently and the proportionof wealth consumed
increases.
As Krusell et al. (2003) point out, the steady-state interest rate (that is, the interest rate




and therefore depends on the parameter σ. In particular, the steady-state interest rate is
decreasing in σ. The reason is that σ measures the curvature of the utility function. At a
steady state, a higher σ means a lower marginal cost of self-control.
The time-consistency approach in the familiar β−δ parametrization generates a related
consumption function for the isoelastic consumption savings problem. (See, for example,
Krusell et al., 2002.) The discounting parameter β plays a similar role as the self-control
parameter λ in our model. However, this close connection only holds superﬁcially. The
time-inconsistency model permits many equilibria. The comparative statics prediction are
therefore speciﬁc to the particular equilibrium selected. For example, at the equilibrium
that is most preferred by the period-0 self, if δ sufﬁciently high the parameter β has no
inﬂuence on the savings behavior of the agent. In this equilibrium (for high δ), the agent
picks the optimal plan for δ and punishes deviations by reverting to a sufﬁciently “bad”
equilibrium. As a second example, consider the equilibrium with the highest savings in a
given period. For high δ it is straightforward to construct equilibria where the agent saves
more for β<1 than the corresponding agent with β = 1. Hence, in general the effect of a
change in β on the savings behavior remains ambiguous in the time-inconsistency model.
Time-inconsistent models specify a dynamic game and hence the multiplicity of
outcomes (and values) is one aspect of the more general phenomenon of multiplicity of
equilibria in dynamic games. However, there is a key difference between a multi-person
setting and a single person decision problem with a time-inconsistent agent. In a multi-
person context, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is meant to capture a rest point of the
player’s expectations and strategizing. The multiplicity of equilibria reﬂects the fact that
there is no communication between players and no single player can coordinate play.
In a time-inconsistent decision problem, it seems straightforward to coordinate
with one’s future self or to renegotiate one’s self out of an unattractive continuation
equilibrium.5 Therefore, the standard argument for why multiplicity should be expected
5 The argument that renegotiation is particularly plausible in time-inconsistent decision problems is due to
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has no force in this context. More generally, the appropriateness of (subgame perfect)
Nash equilibrium often rests on the assumption of “independent” behavior and absence
of communication. But clearly, the agent at time t and his slightly modiﬁed self at time
t +1 are able to communicate and coordinate and hence Nash equilibrium may not be the
appropriate solution concept.6
7. Interpretation and welfare
Our model and time-inconsistent models have in common the feature that an agent
may choose a different period-t consumption depending on when he chooses. The time-
inconsistency approach interprets this divergence as a change in preference. Our model
permits the agent’s preference over consumption in period t to depend on the choice set
from which period-t consumption is chosen. If period-t consumption is chosen in period
0 then this choice is unaffected by temptation. If period-t consumption is chosen in period
t then temptations may distort the agent’s consumption choice. This distortion of behavior
is an optimal response to the presence of temptations taking into account the cost of self-
control.
Suppose the agent chooses to commit at date 0 not to smoke at any future date.
At date t>0 after unexpectedly being offered a cigarette the agent begins to smoke.
Similar examples are typically described as proof of dynamic inconsistency. However,
such reversals may arise even with consistent preferences.7 The agent’s period-t choice
only reveals that when cigarettes are available he prefers to smoke. Hence acceptance of
the cigarette in period t is consistent with a preference for a situation where cigarettes
are unavailable (as his previous choice indicates). Conversely, the period-0 choice is not
in conﬂict with his period-t behavior since in period 0 the agent did not expect that the
promise of commitment would be broken in period t.
Our model differs from the time-inconsistent model in two ways. First, it permits self-
control.Second,it hasclear, testable welfare implications. In terms of welfare implications
our model follows the revealed preference tradition of standard economic models: if the
agent chooses one alternative/policy over another then he is better off with that choice.
However,sinceouragentsvaluecommitment,itis essentialtoincludethetimingofchoices
in the speciﬁcation of the agents’ alternatives.
For example, we deem option a to be better for the agent than option b if the agent
chooses a over b. Since the agents well-being is inﬂuenced by both his consumption and
the temptation he suffers, in our models a satisfactory description of the agents decisions
entails both the consumptions he enjoys and the temptations he suffers.
Consider, for example, a tax policy. Assume that in every period the agent must choose
(deterministic)consumptionfromaﬁxedbudgetthatdependsonthetax τ.LetB(τ)denote
6 For a related critique of the use of Nash equilibrium to model a (different) departure from fully rational
behavior, see Piccione and Rubinstein (1997).
7 Our time-consistent interpretation is in the spirit of Machina (1989), who provides a similar resolution to the
dynamic inconsistency that arises from the failure of the independence axiom.262 F. Gul, W. Pesendorfer / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 243–264
the decision problemwhen the tax is τ in everyperiod. Assume that changes in the tax rate
are permanent.






















Suppose that we must determine the welfare consequences of a change in the tax to τ .
First, suppose this change is considered in period 0. If W(B(τ ))−W(B(τ))>0 then the
change to τ  in period 0 improves the agent’s welfare.
Now suppose that the tax change is considered in period t>0. In a dynamically
consistent model the agent’s welfare corresponds to his choice behavior. That means that
we need to determine whether the agent would choose the tax increase in period t>0.
In period t, the agent cares about period-t consumption and the continuation problem.
Choosing between the two tax rates therefore is equivalent to choosing the period-t
alternative that maximizes u +δW + V in the feasible set of alternatives compatible with


























When the tax change is made in period t, the agent is not committed to B(τ ) in period t.
Rather, he contemplates the choice between the two tax rates. This means that the agent
must evaluate the optimal period-t consumption and continuation problem consistent with
either tax rate. In contrast, when the tax change is proposed in period 0, the agent chooses
between the two choice problems B(τ) and B(τ ). The period-0 choice is unaffected by
temptation. Hence, choosing the tax rate τ  in period 0 and choosing tax rate τ  in period 1
are different outcomes for agent with self-control preferences. Both the agent’s behavior
and our welfare criterion reﬂects this difference.
The key propertyof our (and any) dynamicallyconsistentmodelis thatany two policies
that are feasible at time t can be evaluated using information that is available at time t.I f
policy a is welfare improving then it must be the case that the agent is willing to choose
that policy over the status quo alternative b. Hence, the theory does not allow paternalistic
welfare statements where the agent rejects a policy even though the model describes it
as welfare improving. For example, the tax policy analysis above establishes that for the
speciﬁed range of parameters, the agent’s ﬁrst choice is to commit in period t to the tax
rate τ  (to be implemented in period t + 1). If such a commitment is unavailable, and the
agent has to choose the tax rate in period t that is to be applied starting with period t,t h e n
he prefers the rate τ to τ . Note that once period t is reached commitment to a tax policy
that is effective in period t is no longer an option. Therefore the question of whether he
would have liked such a commitment is irrelevant.
In contrast, the time-inconsistency literature takes the view that the agent in period t is
a differentperson than the agent in period t +1. Policy experimentswill often increase the
utility of some self and at the same time decrease the utility of other selves. In the time-
inconsistency literature, the utility of the period-0 self is sometimes used as the welfare
criterion. Since the individuals’preferencesare changingover time, there is no way to ﬁndF. Gul, W. Pesendorfer / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 243–264 263
out which tax policy the agent would have preferred at time 0, once we reach period t.
Therefore, policy analysis with this criterion boils down to the modelers assessment of
what would have made the period-0 self—an agent who is long dead—better off. Even if
the preferences of the period-0 self happen to be known, it does not seem reasonable for a
social planner to impose a policy option on the grounds that it improves the welfare of an
agent who is no longer present.
Instead of choosing the period-0 utility function as a welfare criterion, some authors
(see Laibson, 1997) have proposed the stronger requirement that all selves be made better
off by a welfare improving policy. Unlike the earlier criterion, this one does not impose
policy recommendations based on the proported preferences of an economic agent that
is no longer in existence. However, it uses such preferences to block policy alternatives.
For example, it may be the case that at time T all of the period-t selves for t  T prefer
an option a to the status quo alternative b but the policy-maker concludes that a does
not dominate b since one or more of the selves prior to time T would have preferred b.
Note that any attempt to remedy this problem will lead to a welfare criterion that is itself
dynamicallyinconsistent.Hence anywelfarecriterionfor time-inconsistentagentsis either
inconsistentitself or hasthe plannerforeverguardingthe perceivedinterests of nonexistent
former selves.
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